

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400040001-4


26 OCT 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/Conventional Forces  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Letter to General Dixon

1. Attached is a draft letter to General Dixon on pushing to revive the Mitre study (which I believe I have in my files) which tried to move from static indicators towards more dynamic ones regarding the balance of air capabilities in Europe. I'd appreciate your looking at whether we could or should employ Mitre or anyone else to improve on that methodology and use the latest information available.

2. I appreciated the efforts in your paper for me to do something of that, such as the employment of the Soviets "combat capability rating." We don't know how they got that but they must have done something such as I'm talking about. (I do wonder how you go from their capability rating chart which shows the F-4E superior to anything but Flogger and Fencer, the F-104/105 equal to everything else, and the F-14/F-15 at least 2 1/2 times better than anything the Soviets have to a "summed combat effectiveness" in which the Soviets have passed us.) Clearly, you've done the mathematics properly but we must have an awful lot of F-100s around, which is the only aircraft on the chart of lesser capability than some of the Soviets'.

3. Thanks.



STANSFIELD TURNER

25X1

Attachment

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400040001-4  
E2 IMPDET  
BY DCI

**SECRET**

D R A F T

General Robert J. Dixon, USAF  
Commander, Headquarters Tactical  
Air Command  
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 23665

Dear Bob,

At the risk of having my head chopped off (!), I'm enclosing a very brief study memorandum that just came across my desk and which brought to mind one of the comments in your famous letter to me of 9 August. You said in the third paragraph, "For example, they fly more training sorties than our pilots and receive more simulator training." The attached study does not dispute that but does contend that the individual duration of training flights is shorter and that there are fewer "combat-related training events."

On another point you make about devoting more attention to a short/no-warning Pact attack, we are about to complete a fairly extensive study on this subject. It considerably downplays the emphasis we've had in recent years on the short or no-warning attack. We simply believe that the disadvantages to the Soviets of going off in 24-48 hours are not compensated by the initial surprise and gains that they might make. I believe Dutch Huyser's recent work has come to a similar conclusion. I'll send you a copy of that study when it is finally printed. (NOTE FOR  Please make a tickler 25X1 on that.)

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400040001-4

Finally, in terms of the overall balance of capabilities, I must say that I still have the impression that we are considerably ahead in the potential for delivering ordnance on targets and enemy territory. I simply believe that despite their improved avionics, range/payload and weapons, most of the Warsaw Pact's tactical aircraft would have considerable difficulty delivering ordnance against NATO targets in a hostile air defense environment without being under positive ground control. Clearly, this would be very inhibiting to them. Perhaps I am overly influenced by the Mitre study we discussed because it stressed this point of positive control and of accuracy of delivery. I'm still of the feeling that it would be wise to update that study or do one using similar methodology. It seems to me we need some more dynamic indicator of the comparative capabilities of NATO and Pact air forces than just the usual static indicators of numbers of aircraft tempered with data on range/payload, avionics and weaponry.

As always, all the best.

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER

Enclosure

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400040001-4

26 OCT 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]  
Chairman, Science & Technology  
Advisory Panel

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

In the course of doing some reading about intelligence the other day, I came across the following paragraph written by a friend which I believe expresses the basic problem which I hope your group that [REDACTED] is going to work with will address:

"Sooner or later, whole classes or capabilities for technical collection must get blown, like individual agents, because they are based essentially on the exploitation of physical principles that are inherently discoverable. One may assert a general rule: In a relatively stable regime of technical collection, the capabilities of the collector tend to become known. They tend then to be denied by passive or active security practices on the part of the observed side. Or they operate at the sufferance of the observed side because he does not care, wishes not to pay the price of security measures, wishes to preserve viable security measures until they are really needed, or wishes to insert deceptive material into the technical sensors. (Here, as in other areas of U.S. intelligence practice, there is a notable lack of theory. Practitioners have no way to grasp the implications of the inherent defeatability and "deceivability" of technical collection over time. They simply assume that technically collected data are valid until proven otherwise, despite the observed side's frequently having a plausible incentive and capability to deceive, and indefinitely to deny firm knowledge that deception has taken place.)"

[REDACTED]  
STANSFIELD TURNER

cc: [REDACTED]

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400040001-4

27 OCT 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Economic Research

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

Do we have any data on comparative Soviet and US economic aid programs over perhaps the last five years? I'm interested in what the gross numbers are and the percentages of GNP if possible.

25X1

STANSFIELD TURNER 7

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400040001-4

**CONFIDENTIAL**

E2 IMPDET  
CL BY DCI

27 October 1977

25X1

NOTE FOR:  EA/DCI

FROM: DCI

Please check on the report I was supposed to give the President on the man who had a particular energy policy the President wanted reviewed.

STANSFIELD TURNER